The Idealism of Ideal Theory

John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice set the agenda for Anglo-American political philosophy since its publication in 1971, but now stands accused of representing a style of theorizing that is irrelevant to the real world. A particular focus of criticism is Rawls’s assumption that unanimous agreement on principles of justice is possible. Critics argue that rather than designing a blueprint of social institutions for an ideal world we should start from where we are; that political philosophers should take social constraints more seriously and focus on how philosophical theory can be applied to real social policy issues. In this paper, I contest this view and argue that it fails to appreciate the way in which Rawls’s approach calls into question the distinction between an ideal world of theory and a real world of political practice. However, while I defend the idealistic impulse driving Rawls’s approach, I draw on Habermas’s critique of Rawls to raise some concerns about its philosophical idealism. Habermas’s position suggests that if philosophy is to truly inform practice and help us understand where we are today, then it needs both greater theoretical abstraction and a more reflexive sense of its place in the contemporary world.